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The mathematical continuum: A haunting problematic 
	
Elizabeth de Freitas1 
Manchester Metropolitan University, United Kingdom 
	
ABSTRACT: The mathematical continuum has a number of formulations and technical 
definitions. Two of these reference the geometric line and the real number system. This 
conceptual coupling of line and number has been an enduring source for mathematical 
invention and paradox. The continuum captures the monstrous desire of mathematics, a 
desire to re-assemble the point with the line, the discrete with the continuous, the finite 
with the infinite. This paper explores how the continuum is a source of fundamental 
ambiguity fueling our desires and fears about mathematics.  
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The haunting 
In set theory, the mathematical continuum refers to the power set of the natural numbers, 
but on a more intuitive plane, the continuum melds the geometric line with the real 
number system. This conceptual coupling of line with number has been an enduring 
source for mathematical invention and paradox. If the density of the real numbers – that 
being the fact that you can always find another real number between any other two - is 
not adequate to ensure that the reals are continuous and without gaps, then there seems to 
be a haunting absence that destabilizes the continuum. Concerns that Euclid’s axioms 
could not, in principle, construct the continuity of the number line lead to various 
attempts to do so in the nineteenth century. Dedekind (1831-1916), intent on banishing 
all geometric “intuition” from mathematics, used classes and “cuts” to compose the 
infinite granularity needed for the continuum. Each real number – each ‘part’ of the 
continuum – was to be uniquely identified with a cut (Dedekind 1901). When the cut 
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designated a rational number, rather than irrational, the number was then assigned to one 
of the two sets on either side of the cut. But in the case of an irrational number, the 
number belonged to neither. In such irrational cases, the number was always on the 
outside of both sets, which made it strangely unreachable and yet adequately defined in 
absentia. Irrational numbers were thus produced through this method, and thus the 
continuum was adequately defined or constructed. And yet the irrationals were somehow 
excluded as well, being outside either set, which for some mathematicians cast some 
small measure of suspicion on Dedekind’s method.  
Cantor (1845-1918) would offer a similar ‘compositional’ approach, proposing 
necessary and sufficient conditions for continuity that relied on set theoretic constraints 
(Ferreirós 1993). As set theory came to dominate the field in the nineteenth century, the 
materiality of the number line was left behind, and the continuum became simply the 
power set of the natural numbers. But haunting this historical development is the 
unresolved continuum hypothesis. This famous hypothesis refers to the proposition that 
there is no set of numbers with cardinality between that of the natural numbers (1, 2, 3, 
…) and that of the real numbers. In other words, the hypothesis can be characterized by 
the claim that the next biggest set, that cannot be counted by the natural numbers, is the 
set of real numbers. The hypothesis predicts that there is no set of numbers with 
cardinality between these two sets, which would mean that the set of Reals captured 
everything between, and that they were continuous. If there is no other set, then there is 
nothing missing from the Reals – there are no gaps haunting them, so to speak.  
Over the centuries, the continuum seems to vibrate with traumatic desire, a desire 
to be both discrete and continuous, counted and uncountable, separate but connected. The 
mathematical continuum seems to function like a desiring machine, spurring 
mathematical inventiveness and ever new axiomatic endeavors. This ongoing concern 
with the continuum reveals the affective-material dimensions of mathematics. The 
traumatic investment in cutting up the continuum shows how mathematics taps an animal 
desire, a desire to fold continuously with the world, but also to cut oneself off as discrete 
individual (de Freitas 2016b). The mathematical continuum encapsulates our collective 
dilemma - we are all connected, but we are all individuals. The rumbling continuum 
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captures the monstrous desire of mathematics, a desire to re-assemble the discrete with 
the continuous, the finite with the infinite, the point with the line.  
The diabolical 
More generally, measurement harbors a profound anxiety about the ontological status of 
continua (Serres 2017). For instance, the early calculus relied on the use of infinitesimals 
- infinitely small continua - to accurately calculate various kinds of quantities in problems 
and applications. These were named indivisibles because they were considered a kind of 
fundamental element, without discrete parts, that could be infinitely distorted, inflated or 
stretched. They had no ‘parts’ in the conventional sense of separable parts, but they 
possessed a potential for differentiation, a sort of difference in itself. In other words, they 
seemed to be changelings that could be used as discrete entities with definitive outlines, 
and yet open to stretching and inflating as need be. Thus their very status seemed to 
bridge the continuous and the discrete, object and relation. In some sense, they were both 
and neither, and thus they perplexed those who argued for atomism and also those who 
argued against it. Aristotle argued against the existence of these infinitesimal 
‘indivisibles’; while, Archimedes deployed indivisibles in his computation of areas and 
volumes in the second century BC.  
Archimedes’ calculation techniques were taken up and further developed in the 
1600s, during a period of intense mathematical invention in which infinitesimal 
calculation flourished. And yet the very idea of a smallest interval that could not be 
further dissected was indeed the source of many paradoxes. The infinitesimal of 
Bonaventura Torricelli (1598-1647) and Evangelista Cavallieri (1608-1647) was 
considered so radical that the Jesuits outlawed it in European education institutions. 
In the 1630s, Jesuit fathers in Rome banned the doctrine of infinitesimals, in part 
because of these paradoxes, declaring the idea to be dangerous and subversive, and 
denouncing those who taught it. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe the infinitesimal as 
always “diabolical” because it undermines the atomism and fixity of individuals, and 
binds number and matter through infinite variation (p. 109). 
Various definitions have emerged over the years – perhaps the simplest is that the 
infinitesimal is an infinitely small interval. Leibniz (1646-1716) used the term 
 
 TME, vol. 15, nos. 1&2, p. 151 
infinitesimal to designate the distance between two numbers that are infinitely close 
(Alexander 2014). This strange idea – that a continuous interval could be infinitely small 
– runs counter to our intuitions about intervals as lengths that can always be divided into 
yet smaller lengths. In what sense could an interval be infinitely small? Infinitesimals are 
like continua “viewed in the small” as though one could zoom in and find the ultimate 
miniscule straight lines that composed the macro surfaces that we typically encounter. 
Others have described the infinitesimal as a quantity less than any finite quantity, a 
quantity that operates beneath the finite world (de Freitas 2016a). Such quantities don’t 
play by the usual rules, however, being so small that their squares and other powers can 
be neglected. Perhaps the infinitesimal is an intensive magnitude rather than an extensive 
magnitude, and as such partakes in the material world in quite different ways, weaving 
the mathematical continuum together.  
The paradoxical 
A closer look at the seminal work of Cavalieri and Torricelli in the seventeenth century 
sheds light on why there was so much concern. But it also shows how the mathematical 
continuum, as source for the paradoxical, was pivotal in the development of the calculus. 
In other words, the paradoxical was the driving force of invention. Torricelli, in 
particular, created highly accessible treatises and offered “short, direct and positive 
proofs” using infinitesimals (or indivisibles). Unlike Cavailieri, whose work was 
burdened by attempts to avoid paradoxes, Toricelli delved into the paradoxes and put 
them to work in a new kind of calculus. The mathematician and historian Amir 
Alexander (2014) claims that Torricelli “reveled in paradoxes” (p.111) and tapped the 
contradictions that emerged when one assumed the continuum was composed of 
indivisibles, using them as tools for investigation (p.111). “The paradoxes were, in a way, 
Torricelli’s mathematical experiments … For Torricelli, paradoxes … pushed logic to the 
extreme, thereby revealing the true nature of the continuum, which cannot be accessed by 
normal mathematical means” (Alexander 2014, p.112). 
As a simple example, consider the task of calculating the area of a parallelogram 
(Fig. 1). We divide the parallelogram into two equal triangles, and imagine the space of 
the two triangles composed of lines with infinitesimal width (here shown as dotted lines), 
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in one triangle they are vertical and the other horizontal. Following the methods of the 
early calculus, these infinitesimal lines can be added up to determine the area of each 
triangle (much like we might integrate under a curve by adding up the differential 
rectangles).  
 
	
Fig. 1  Toricelli and paradox 
 
But if we compare each infinitesimal line in one triangle with a corresponding 
line in the other, we see that the vertical line will always be shorter than the horizontal. It 
then follows, through pure logic, that since the vertical lines are always shorter than the 
horizontal to which they are compared, the result obtained after adding them will always 
be less. One triangle will have more area than the other! Contradiction! Cavalieri tried to 
avoid such paradoxes by not allowing indivisibles to be compared that were not parallel. 
But Torricelli would take up this simple paradox and delve into its potential for 
rethinking the mathematical continuum. Indeed, the reciprocity in this example, how we 
move back and forth between the vertical and the horizontal (lines of width dx and lines 
of width dy), will be used to huge advantage.  
Torricelli introduced an entirely different way of thinking about composition and 
argued that there was a way that the longer lines could indeed add up to the shorter lines. 
The significance of this for my argument is that he was willing to break with the ruling 
doxa of the time, and did so by introducing a difference into a concept where there had 
been none before. He quite simply contradicted Euclid’s definition of a line and claimed 
that the short lines are wider than the long lines. In other words, lines are not all without 
width, nor are they all of equal width (Alexander 2014). The idea that some lines were 
wider than others was a revolutionary idea, and broke with conventional definitions of the 
line. The same proposal was made for indivisible points that might inflate to varying 
C
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sizes, and indivisible planes of varying thickness. It was as if Toricelli was carving out a 
new virtual dimension for these geometric objects, which suddenly allowed them to 
distort in convenient ways. Indivisibles were shown to possess a previously imperceptible 
dimension, which was allowed infinite variation in magnitude, and thus an infinitary 
calculus was born.  
This controversial move allowed one to calculate various measures that had never 
before been attempted, extending mathematics reach and relevance, and re-assembling 
the relationship between mathematics and matter. If lines had infinitesimal width and 
planes had infinitesimal thickness, then geometry engaged with matter in new ways. 
These geometric concepts became physico-mathematical entities. Despite their awkward 
ontological status, people began to use infinitesimals in their calculations, calling them 
“linelets” and “timelets” and “evanescent quantities” and “inassignable quantities”.  
Concerns over their ontological status, however, would eventually lead to a theory 
of limits and an attempt to rid mathematics of actually infinite small quantities. Limit 
theory would eventually rule the day. But there have always been advocates for 
infinitesimals, and they continue to be of interest today. In the nineteenth century, for 
instance, the mathematician Paul du Bois-Reymond (1831-1889) argued on their behalf, 
stating, “The proposition that the number of points of division of the unit length is 
infinitely large produces with logical necessity the belief in the infinitely small.” He 
advocated for a geometric number line composed of points and infinitesimal intervals. 
Charles Dodgson (1832-1898) and Charles Peirce (1839-1914) were also advocates for 
the infinitesimal. For Peirce, a continuous line contained no points, only continuous 
infinitesimal intervals. Wherever a point occurs, claimed Peirce, that point “interrupts the 
continuity” (CP 6.168). For Peirce, infinitesimals could be used for measurement without 
disrupting continuity. In other words, infinitesimals were measurements intrinsic to the 
continuous entity, and thus they avoided the perennial concern that measures of the 
continuous were always imposed from without (always the discrete fumbling to make 
sense of the robust continuous). Accordingly, infinitesimals were a “continuity-
preserving method of measurement” (Buckley 2012, p. 149). The infinitesimal was 
finally given formal legitimacy (aside from its evident pragmatic value) in the 1960s 
when the mathematician Abraham Robinson produced a powerful and coherent 
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foundation for the hyperreal numbers, which incorporated infinitesimals, transfinite 
numbers and the real numbers in one system (Bell 2013).  
Abduction and indeterminacy  
The marriage of the number line with the Real numbers brings hope and promise for an 
ultimate kind of synergy where measure and matter partake together of an onto-logical 
mixture. The continuum thus becomes a means of fusing connectives and quantifiers, 
geometry and arithmetic, the finite and the infinite. The paradoxes that haunt the 
continuum continue to be a driving force for new mathematical adventures today (Katz & 
Tall 2011, Katz & Poley 2017). The mathematician Fernando Zalamea (2012) 
demonstrates how contemporary developments in Category theory build on Peirce’s work 
in the late nineteenth century on the mathematical continuum. Peirce merged modal logic 
with mathematics in novel ways, introducing the notion of abduction as a pivotal form of 
inference.2 Peirce considered abduction “the process of forming explanatory hypotheses.” 
and claimed that “It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea” (CP 
5.172). According to Peirce, abduction is a crucial form of reasoning in mathematics, and 
operates unlike induction and deduction, in that it involves systematic guessing. The 
guess becomes a key act of reason, a full-fledged form of operating mathematically.  
Abduction is precisely how we hypothesize about an odd irregular event, and thus 
it plays a pivotal role in how we might respond to the weird number that refuses to obey 
our axioms, or the anxiety when faced with the apparent gaps in the continuum. We can’t 
use deduction or induction in such instances, but must employ a different form of 
thinking. Abduction is at work when we devise means – as Dedekind did - of gluing the 
continuum back together wherever a cleavage or cut or gap is discerned. Speculating – or 
what Peirce would call guessing - is crucial in response to such tears in the fabric of life. 
In other words, a certain “explanatory continuum” is achieved through abduction, as it 
knits the torn threads of the mathematical continuum, darning the holes with speculation. 
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An abduction is a process that one might say supplements induction and deduction in our 
efforts to ‘explain’ the continuum.  
More specifically, abduction is characterized as the act of composing a hypothesis 
based on an observation of an irregularity that occurs in relation to expectations. This 
might be characterized as a “vague” deformation of syllogistic deduction that allows one 
to form a “retro-implicative inference” (Zalamea 2012, p.100). The table below, derived 
from that of Zalamea (2012), shows how abduction differs from deduction and induction, 
in terms of the kind of inference that is allowed: 
Deduction	 Induction	 Abduction	
All	X	is	Y	
Some	Z	is	X	
Some	Z	is	Y	
Some	Z	is	X	
Some	Z	is	Y	
All	X	is	Y	
All	X	is	Y	
Some	Z	is	Y	
Some	Z	is	X	
 
These examples help us discern the differences between different forms of 
reasoning, underscoring the ambition and weakness of each. In the case of abduction, the 
inference is deeply speculative, venturing to posit something that cannot be deduced or 
induced. Vagueness is precisely what makes abduction so powerful - guessing introduces 
possibilities of ‘errors’ but it also performs a kind of reasoning that cannot be achieved 
otherwise. In deduction, we know there are members of Z that are definitively part of Y, 
but in abduction we only know that members of Z may be part of a smaller set contained 
within the set to which they belong. Maybe so, maybe not. Note how terribly easy it is to 
go ‘wrong’ in abduction. The point here is that abduction plugs into our uncertainty – our 
not knowing - in a very particular and productive way. We use abduction regularly on a 
daily basis, whenever we form a hypothesis based on limited knowledge and generate a 
plausible explanation. Abduction tries to explain systematically a break or a breach in 
regularity or homogeneity or order, and is thus the very instrument needed when faced 
with the irruptions and gaps of the ever illusive continuum.   
Thus the deep task of abduction may be seen as locally gluing breaks in the 
continuum, by means of an arsenal of methods which select effectively the “closer” 
explanatory hypotheses for a given break and which try to “erase” discontinuities from a 
new regularizing perspective: 
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Fig. 2  Image from Zalamea, 2012, p. 102 
 
Through the speculative act of abduction, we smudge the discontinuity and patch 
together both the mathematical continuum but also the cosmological continuum of life 
itself. Abduction, however, is not only a human faculty, but is an expression of a worldly 
synechism and tychism – the terms that Peirce used to describe his metaphysics of 
continuity and chance. For Peirce, continuity and chance are the two entangled 
metaphysical attributes of the world. Through abduction, chance is leveraged to mend the 
break in any continuum. Chance is a crucial term for Peirce, because it is through 
probability and modal logic that he will pursue abduction more systematically. There is a 
combinatorial logic in the act of guessing, a process of mapping the span of possibility, a 
habit of listing all possible outcomes, and then ‘counting the chances’ of one outcome 
occurring in the midst of that set of possibilities, more or less exactly. “What are the 
odds?” we ask, of finding an irrational number in this set, and we begin to weave 
hypotheses and stitch a covering of some kind, glimpsing and encountering provisionally 
the virtual realm of minuscule differentiations – this, and/or this, and/or this, and/or this, 
and/or this, and/or this, … in an iterative process that is at the heart of the concept of 
algorithm. Abduction engages with what we don’t know, the essential not-knowing that 
spurs on a speculative hypothesis – a “plausible explanation” – selected from the 
differentiated sea of reason. This sea is so turbulent that we are made sea-sick, aghast at 
the vanishing indivisibles that subtend the threshold of imperceptibility. As Zalamea 
(2012) suggests, this realm is populated by an “infinitude of useless hypotheses” (p.102).  
As the hallmark of our not-knowing, chance is the engine of a profound 
ontological indeterminism. Chance haunts the continuum, interrupting its smoothness, but 
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also mending and stitching over the gaps. Peirce’s proposal that abduction is the warp 
and weave of the mathematical continuum gives the continuum hypothesis all its cosmic 
and encyclopedic dimensions. Rather than concern ourselves with error and delusion, as 
the cogito would have us do, the mathematical continuum demands that we make the 
coupling of line and number a transcendental problem. Chance and continuity together 
becomes a generative problematics – still haunting, diabolical and paradoxical – but 
wisely at work for no purpose that we can fathom. As Deleuze (1990) suggests, the 
interval is more than a naïve measure, more than a hasty line drawn in the sand, but 
instead a gesture that affirms all of chance, a gesture that affirms indeterminacy as a 
plenitude rather than a lack. This profound indeterminism haunts the mathematical 
continuum like a hungry ghost.  
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